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INTRODUCTION

Article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution provides that decisions of the courts of appeals are to be conclusive on all questions of
facts. Since its adoption in 1891, this provision has been consistently
interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court to mean that the decisions of
the intermediate appellate courts in civil cases are final when issues of
factual sufficiency are raised. The Texas Court of Criminal appeals
has not adopted this interpretation in regard to appellate review of
criminal cases by the courts of appeals.
In 1981, the Texas Constitution was amended to confer criminal
jurisdiction on the former courts of civil appeals. Since that time, the
court of criminal appeals has wrestled with the meaning of the word
"conclusive," as it is used in article V, section 6. However, that court
has been reluctant to accept the constitutionally mandated authority
of the courts of appeals to act as the final arbiters of fact questions.
Instead, in spite of a constitutional mandate to the contrary, that
court continues to refuse to recognize the authority of the courts of
appeals to determine questions of factual sufficiency of the evidence.
There is no sound basis for the disparate interpretations of a single
constitutional provision based on whether the matter on appeal is civil
or criminal in nature.
This article examines the Texas Constitution's grant of authority to
appellate courts to review fact questions and the Texas Supreme
Court's treatment of that authority. It then contrasts that treatment
with the contrary position taken by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals since 1981. The sentiments of the courts of appeals themselves
are examined. The decisions which are analyzed readily demonstrate
that the constitutional provision in question is not viewed uniformly
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by the highest courts of Texas; that much confusion and dissatisfaction have resulted; and that a better, more logical approach in interpreting the constitution is demanded of the court of criminal appeals.
Also illustrated is that court's tenacious refusal to acknowledge, as
has the Texas Supreme Court, that the article V, section 6 factual
conclusivity clause is a limitation on its authority. Finally, this article
suggests an appropriate solution to the problems resulting from the
different interpretations of one constitutional provision.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURT FACT JURISDICTION

The Texas Constitution of 1876 created an intermediate court of
appeals with appellate jurisdiction in all criminal and civil cases
where the county courts had original jurisdiction.' Due to growing
congestion in the appellate system, article V, section 6 was amended
in 1891 to establish intermediate courts to decide civil cases only-the
courts of civil appeals.2 This amendment converted the old Texas
Court of Appeals-the only appellate court then determining appeals
in criminal cases-into the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and elevated it to the same level as the supreme court.3 Furthermore, section
6 was amended to read: "Said Court[s] of Civil Appeals shall have
appellate jurisdiction ...

under such restrictions and regulations as

may be prescribed by law. Provided, that the decision of said courts
1. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 6 (1876, amended 1891); see also Clarence A. Guittard, The
Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 550 (1983). The next step
was the creation of a commission of appeals to which the supreme court and the court of
appeals could transfer cases if the parties agreed. Act approved July 9, 1879, 16th Leg., 1st
C.S., ch. 34 §§ 1, 7, 8, 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws 30, 30-31, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 62, 6263 (1898).
2. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1891); see also I GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 398-99
(1977) (most significant portion of 1891 reform package was creation of courts of civil appeals). The establishment of a system of intermediate appellate courts was a predictable resolution of the backlog of cases then pending in the supreme court since federal courts of appeals
were also initiated in 1891. Id.; see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 8 (3rd ed. 1976) (circuit courts of appeals created in 1891 after century of dissatisfaction with prior court structure).
3. See generally TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 4-6 (1891, amended 1981); Clarence A. Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1983)
(amendment also eliminated commission of appeals). Despite the creation of the intermediate
appellate court, the commission of appeals was reestablished in 1918 due to the backlog of
cases in the supreme court. Id. at 550-51.
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shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on
appeal or error."' 4 Over the years, the number of intermediate appellate courts has grown from the original three to fourteen.5 Additionally, the number of judges authorized to sit on each court has been
increased.6
Due to congestion and delay7 in the court of criminal appeals, in
1979 the legislature adopted Senate Joint Resolution 36 which pro4. TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 6 (1891, amended 1981); see I GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 400

(1977) (provision interpreted as limitation on supreme court's scope of review). However, this
provision is not viewed as a specific grant of power to the courts of appeals. Id. The courts of

civil appeals were created on the theory that "they should be really great courts and their
decisions final in a large class of cases from which no appeal would lie." M.M. Crane, Suggestions for Improving Court Procedure in Texas, 5 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1927). The purpose
behind the establishment of the intermediate appellate courts was to restrict the jurisdiction of
the supreme court to maintaining uniformity of decisions between those courts and to preventing those courts from creating any precedent that would be against the public interest. See id.
5. See generally W.O. Murray, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 25 TEX. B.J. 269, 270, 324
(1962) (reviewing history of Texas appellate courts). When the 22nd legislature met at its first
called session in 1892, it divided the state into three supreme judicial districts and situated a
court of civil appeals in each district. The first district court of appeals was to sit in Galveston,
the second in Fort Worth, and the third in Austin. Id. at 270, 324. The following year, two
additional districts were created and the courts for those districts were located at San Antonio
and Dallas. The state was redistricted again in 1907, with the sixth district being located at
Texarkana, and again in 1911, with the seventh and eighth districts being placed at Amarillo
and El Paso, respectively. Id. at 324. The Ninth Supreme Judicial District was created in
1915, and that court was situated at Beaumont, and in 1923 the legislature established the
tenth district located at Waco. The Eleventh Court of Civil Appeals was created in 1925 and
was to hold its sessions at Eastland. Id. at 325. In 1957, the Court of Civil Appeals for the
First District was given legislative permission to sit at either Houston or Galveston. Act of
June 6, 1957, 55th Leg., R.S., ch. 421, § 2, 1957 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1263, 1263. The last three
courts of civil appeals were created in 1963 and 1967. See generally Clarence A. Guittard, The

Expanded Texas Courtsof Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 n.12 (1983). The Twelfth
and Thirteenth Supreme Judicial Districts were established at Tyler and Corpus Christi, and
the Fourteenth Supreme Judicial District was created and authorized to sit at either Galveston
or Houston. Id.
6. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1978, amended 1980); see also Clarence A. Guittard, The
Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 (1983).
7. See generally Carl E.F. Dally & Patricia A. Brockway, Changes in Appellate Review in
CriminalCases Following the 1980 ConstitutionalAmendment, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 211, 213
(1981) (constitution amended to create intermediate level of appellate review of criminal cases
in order to relieve congested docket of court of criminal appeals); Clarence A. Guittard, The
Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 553 (1983) (before 1981
amendment, average time of pendency from notice of appeal to denial of discretionary review
more than three years). The American Bar Association recommends that such appeals be
disposed of within six months.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: STANDARDS RELATING To
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.52 (1977).
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posed a constitutional amendment to provide for intermediate appeals
in criminal cases.' With the implementation of this amendment in
1981, the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts was expanded to include criminal cases. 9 This was accomplished by the simple deletion of the word "civil" from the jurisdiction granting portion
of section 6.10 The critical portion of section 6-the essence of which
has remained unchanged for one hundred years-is the proviso which
makes decisions of the courts of appeals conclusive on all questions of
fact. II
III.
A.

THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT'S VIEW

Early Cases
1. Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. 12

Since 1898 in the early case of Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry.,
the supreme court has recognized that the Texas Constitution confers
upon the courts of appeals "appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law." 13 In that case,
8. Tex. S.J. Res. 36, §§ 5-6, 66th Leg., R.S., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 3223, 3224-25 (adopted
as TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6).
9. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; see Carl E.F. Daily & Patricia A. Brockway, Changes in

Appellate Review in Criminal Cases Following the 1980 Constitutional Amendment, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 211, 213 (1981) (amendment transformed courts of civil appeals into courts of
appeals and broadened their jurisdiction to include criminal as well as civil appeals).
10. Compare TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1978, amended 1980) with TEX. CONST. art. V,

§ 6.

11. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; see Mike McColloch, CriminalProcedure,Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 529, 579-82 (1984) (noting Texas Supreme Court and Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals cases in historical progression of courts of appeals' fact jurisdiction). But see
I GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 400-01 (1977) (provision interpreted as meaning intermediate
appellate court decisions on factual matters not conclusive when matters arise in original proceeding). This exception has little significance because these courts have no general power to
find facts. Id.
12. 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69 (1898).
13. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6; see also 1 GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 401-02 (1977) (intermediate courts' jurisdiction derived from first and second paragraphs of article V, section 6).
The first paragraph of section 6 grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction over all civil cases
wherein the district or county courts have either original or appellate jurisdiction. Id. The
next paragraph dictates that these courts are to have such other jurisdiction, either original or
appellate "as may be prescribed by law." Id. at 402 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6). Braden indicates that there is case law which suggests that this second grant of jurisdiction is
controlled by the legislature. However, the first paragraph is seen as a constitutional grant of
authority which the legislature may regulate but not deny. Id.; see also Outlaw v. Gulf Oil
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the court interpreted the newly adopted article V, section 6 as a
means to "restrict, in express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme
court, and to confine it to questions of law." 14 In so stating, the
supreme court recognized that the same amendments which created
the intermediate appellate courts also acted to divest the supreme
court of its jurisdiction to hear questions of factual sufficiency. In
Choate, the court stated that the "action [of the courts of civil apCorp., 137 S.W.2d 787, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 136
Tex. 281, 150 S.W.2d 777 (1941) (constitutional right of appeal from final judgment may not
be denied by legislature, but manner of appeal may be regulated). But see Ex parte Lewis, 663
S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ) (jurisdiction established by constitution
and statutes enabling jurisdiction on a limited basis should not be construed as including matters statute does not specifically cover).
14. Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 410, 44 S.W. 69, 69 (1898). In the
first Choate case, the court of civil appeals determined that Choate's jury verdict was not
sustained by the evidence. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Choate, 35 S.W. 180, 181 (Tex. Civ.
App.), aff'd, 90 Tex. 82, 36 S.W. 247, rev'd on reh'g, 90 Tex. 82, 37 S.W. 319 (1896). It,
therefore, reversed and remanded the case with special instructions that, if the same evidence
was presented at a new trial, the court should direct a judgment for the defendant. Id. On
appeal to the supreme court, Choate maintained that these directives amounted to the court of
civil appeals rendering a judgment against him even though there was some evidence which
supported the jury's verdict. Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 90 Tex. 82, 85, 36 S.W. 247,
249, rev'd on reh'g, 90 Tex. 82, 37 S.W. 319 (1896). The supreme court at first affirmed,
determining that there was no evidence of negligence by the railroad as a matter of law. Id. at
249-50. However, on motion for rehearing, the supreme court determined that the evidence
did not preclude a difference of opinion, and that the directions which accompanied the court
of civil appeals' opinion amounted to that court's rendering a judgment and were, therefore,
erroneous. Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 90 Tex. 82, 89, 37 S.W. 319, 319 (1896).
After a second verdict in Choate's favor, the court of civil appeals again held there was
insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Choate, 43 S.W. 537,
538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), writ dism'd, 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69 (1898). In determining that it
had jurisdiction to review the court of civil appeals' decision, the supreme court stated:
"Whether there be any evidence or not is a question for the judge; whether it is sufficient
evidence is a question for the jury." . . . So that it is elementary that whether there be any
evidence or not to support an issue is a question of law and not of fact; and it follows that
the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals upon such a question is subject to review by this
court.
Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 409, 44 S.W. 69, 69 (1898). The court went
on to state that the court of civil appeals did not, however, have the power to conclusively
determine the facts of any case:
Our bill of rights contains the emphatic declaration, that "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." . . . It is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact; but it is
in the power of the trial judge to set aside the finding, and to award a new trial. The
Court of Civil Appeals has the same power upon appeal.... The [s]upreme [c]ourt, before
the amendments in question had jurisdiction on appeal or a writ of error over the facts of
a case ....
This same power is conferred by the amendments upon the Court of Civil
Appeals.
Id. at 69-70.
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peals] upon such questions is made final, and not subject to be reviewed by this court."' 5 Since Choate, the precise meaning of article
V, section 6 has been reconsidered on occasion.
2.

In re King's Estate 6

In the 1951 case of In re King's Estate, the supreme court sought to
clarify the role of the intermediate appellate courts when those courts
are asked to consider questions of factual sufficiency. 7 In that decision, the court noted that while the court of civil appeals gave the
correct wording of the appellant's point of error, which was one of
factual insufficiency to support the jury's verdict, the intermediate
court had incorrectly treated the point as being a question of law.'"
The court directed the courts of civil appeals to consider and weigh
all of the evidence in order to determine whether the evidence was
insufficient or whether the verdict was so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. 9 In attempting to delineate the role of the courts of appeals when asked to

15. Choate, 44 S.W. at 70.
16. 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). This case involved a will contest where the
appellant, Carl King, was named the independent executor. King v. King, 242 S.W.2d 925,
928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1951), rev'd, In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660
(1951). At trial, the jury found that the deceased did not have testamentary capacity to write a
valid will. The will was, therefore, set aside, and the estate was to vest in her heirs in
accordance with the laws of descent and distribution. Id.
17. See In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661 (appellate court required to examine and
weigh all evidence presented prior to determining factual sufficiency). See generally W. St.
John Garwood, The Question of Insufficient Evidence on Appeal, 30 TEx. L. REV. 803, 804-05
(1952) (discussing rules to be applied by courts of civil appeals where verdict is attacked as
being against great weight and preponderance of evidence).
18. In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661. The appellant complained on appeal that the
jury's finding of lack of testamentary capacity was against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence. King, 242 S.W.2d at 929. In addressing the appellant's point of error, the
court of civil appeals stated that if there is "any evidence of probative force to support this
finding of the jury, such finding is conclusive and binding on both the trial court and this
court." Id.
19. In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661. The court observed that when the question of
factual sufficiency is raised, the court of civil appeals is required "in the exercise of its peculiar
powers under the constitution" to consider all of the evidence presented in the case. The court
of civil appeals had incorrectly examined only that evidence which supported the jury's verdict. The supreme court stated that the court of civil appeals' incorrect treatment of the point
of error was, in effect, a refusal by that court to rule on the point. Because the court below
failed to rule on the appellants' point of error, the supreme court could properly take jurisdiction of the case in spite of the fact that judgments of the courts of civil appeals are final where
questions of factual sufficiency are raised. Id.
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determine sufficiency of evidence questions, the supreme court recognized that it was complicated to describe the intellectual process to be
followed by those courts.2 °
2
3. Traylor v. Goulding '

The supreme court again attempted to clarify the role of intermediate appellate courts in 1973 in Traylor v. Goulding, by reaffirming that
the decisions of those courts are final when great weight and preponderance points of error are raised on appeal.22 The court in Traylor
again stated the rule that the intermediate appeals courts are required
to weigh all of the evidence and remand for a new trial when they
conclude that a jury verdict is so against the great weight
and prepon23
derance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
20. Id. at 662. The court further said:
But Article 5, [sic] § 6 of the Constitution ... is no more to be ignored than any other
part of that document, and that provision, with the decisions, statutes and rules based
upon it, requires the Court of Civil Appeals, upon proper assignment, to consider the fact
question of weight and preponderance of all the evidence and to order or deny a new trial
accordingly as to the verdict may thus appear to it clearly unjust or otherwise.
Id. The court noted that if article V, section 6 were interpreted otherwise, "there would be no
'questions of fact' for the Court of Civil Appeals to determine." Id.
21. 497 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1973).
22. Id. at 945. Traylor was a medical malpractice case in which the jury failed to find
that certain omissions on the part of the defendant, Dr. Goulding, proximately caused any
damage to Traylor. Id. at 944-45. On appeal, Traylor contended that the jury's negative
findings were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be wrong
and unjust. Traylor v. Goulding, 497 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1972), rev'd, 497 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1973). The court of civil appeals determined that, absent a
contention by Traylor that the evidence established affirmative findings as a matter of law,
nothing was presented for review. Id. at 471. Traylor argued to the supreme court that the
court of civil appeals' holding amounted to a refusal on its part to exercise its fact-finding
jurisdiction as required by article V, section 6 and, as such, was an error of law. See Traylor,
497 S.W.2d at 945. The supreme court agreed and stated that, although the judgment of the
courts of civil appeals is final when questions of factual sufficiency are raised, when those
courts' determination of the question is based on an incorrect view of the law, it was required
to remand the case to the court of civil appeals for consideration of the question based upon
proper legal standards. Id.
23. Traylor v. Goulding, 497 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. 1973). The supreme court stated
that when a petitioner urges that the jury's failure to find a fact is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence, the court of civil appeals' fact-finding jurisdiction is invoked.
Therefore, the court of civil appeals' determination that it would not exercise its jurisdiction
when the jury's answers were in the negative was in conflict with earlier supreme court decisions. Id.; see also Parrish v. Hunt, 160 Tex. 378, 380, 331 S.W.2d 304, 306 (1960) (appellate
court erred in failing to consider points of error on jury's failure to find answers was against
great weight and preponderance of evidence).
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Survival Against Recent Attacks on Courts of Appeals' Fact
Jurisdiction

In the past decade or so, the conclusive nature of decisions by the
courts of appeals on fact questions has been attacked by civil plaintiffs
who had suffered at the hands of the intermediate courts when
favorable judgments were set aside because those courts found the evi-

dence to be insufficient to support the judgments.24 The supreme
court, when asked, has declined to interpret article V, section 6 in a
manner that would preclude the intermediate courts from exercising
such fact jurisdiction. 25 In Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,26 the supreme

court set out certain guidelines to be followed by courts of appeals
when reversing a trial court's judgment on "factual insufficiency of
the evidence" or "against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence" grounds. 27 Following the Pool decision, the Texas Supreme

Court was asked to hold that, even if a court of appeals could "unfind" a fact found by a jury, the intermediate court lacked authority

24. See, e.g., Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 648-49 (Tex. 1988)
(ability of court of appeals to overturn jury award of $2.5 million actual damages and $250,000
in punitive damages upheld); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633-35 (Tex. 1986)
(supreme court reaffirmed that court of appeals' exercise of fact jurisdiction does not undermine jury verdict or conflict with right to trial by jury).
25. See Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 651 (courts of appeals have authority to reverse and remand upon determination that jury's failure to find is against great weight and preponderance
of evidence); Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 633 (court rejected Pool's argument that court of appeals'
exercise of fact jurisdiction was improper); see also W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate
Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 913 (1990) (court in Cropper rejected challenge to courts of appeals' constitutional authority and obligation to review fact questions). In
response to the petitioner's challenge that such review violated the right to trial by jury, the
court stressed that the right of the appellate courts to review fact questions and the right to
trial by jury had "peacefully co-existed for almost one hundred fifty years" and that both were
"thoroughly rooted in our constitution and judicial system." Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 652;
accord Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988) (reaffirming courts of appeals'
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of factual sufficiency); see also W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 913 (1990).
26. 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
27. Id. at 635. Pool directed courts of appeals to set out, in detail,
the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and to clearly state why the jury's
finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be
manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or why it clearly demonstrates bias. Further, those courts, in their opinions, should state in what regard the contrary evidence
greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict. It is only in this way that the
supreme court will be able to determine if the requirements of In re King's Estate have
been satisfied.
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to conclude that a jury's failure to find a particular fact was against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
In Cropperv. CaterpillarTractor Co. ,28 the court declined to depart
from its previous position and held that the courts of appeals have the
authority to review a jury's "failure to find" a fact in the same manner
in which they review a jury's findings.29 Significant in the opinion was
the painstaking review of the constitutional origin of appellate court
jurisdiction over fact questions.3" The court looked at the two clauses
of section 6: the first, granting courts of appeals appellate jurisdiction
as may be prescribed by law; the second, providing that the decisions
of the courts of appeals are to be conclusive on questions of fact. The
court observed that the former clause operates as a general grant of
appellate jurisdiction; the latter clause, referred to as the "factual conclusivity clause," was pronounced to function not as a grant of authority to the courts of appeals, but as a limitation upon the authority
of a higher court.31 The court reviewed cases before the 1891 amendment to the constitution in which it had exercised the power to review
jury verdicts on fact issues.32 It then said that the amendment, which
created the courts of civil appeals, gave those courts the same powers
over fact questions as the Texas Supreme Court had exercised before
the amendment.33
The court announced that in one of its earliest decisions, in 1841, it
had held that "a court operating under a general grant of appellate
28. 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988).
29. Id. at 647 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6).
30. Id. at 648-49 (discussion of cases from 1841 to present that uphold right of appellate
courts to review fact questions).
31. Id. at 648; see also Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 410, 44 S.W. 69,
69 (1898) (purpose of amendment giving exclusive jurisdiction over fact questions to courts of
appeals was to restrict jurisdiction of supreme court to questions of law). See generally, 1
GEORGE D. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 400-01 (1977) (second clause of article V, section 6 viewed as limitation on authority of supreme court to review factual sufficiency questions).
32. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Somers, 78 Tex. 439, 441, 14 S.W. 779, 779 (1890)
(court has power and duty to review facts of case and set aside jury verdict when against
preponderance of evidence); Redus v. Burnett, 59 Tex. 576, 582 (1883) (jury verdict manifestly against weight of evidence subject to reversal by supreme court); Garvin v. Stover, 17
Tex. 292, 299 (1856) (evidence determined insufficient to support jury verdict).
33. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. 1988). In its review of
the jury's verdict in favor of the appellant, the court of appeals had the same authority that the
supreme court possessed before the 1891 amendment. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6
(defining intermediate appellate court jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction had the power to review fact questions. ' 34 Of more than
passing interest is the fact that the court also cited an 1841 case which
recognized that the Texas Supreme Court could review both fact and
law questions in a criminal case.35 That decision, Republic v. Smith,3 6

actually supports the proposition advanced in this article.
In the final analysis, the Cropperdecision is a strong reaffirmance of
the Pool decision. The court, recognizing that Pool contains language
which reflects some "discomfort with the holding," nonetheless conceded the conclusivity of intermediate appeals court decisions on fact
questions.37
IV.

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS' VIEW

A.

Background
1. Before the 1980 Constitutional Amendment
Before legislation implemented the 1980 constitutional amendment
that renamed the courts of appeals and vested them with criminal
jurisdiction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals appeared to understand the unique appellate role of the intermediate courts. In 1980 in
White v. State,38 that court was called upon to consider all the evidence and to set aside a verdict because of factually insufficient evidence.3 9 The court declined, saying essentially that it was not
empowered to do so since it was not a court of civil appeals.' Then
Presiding Judge Onion, writing for a unanimous court, said:
What appellant is asking this court to do is to consider all the evidence-that which supports the verdict and that which does not-and
to set aside the verdict if we conclude that it is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
34. Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 648 (citing Bailey v. Haddy, Dallam 376 (Tex. 1841)).
35. Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 649 (citing Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex. 1841)).
36. Republic v. Smith, Dallam 407 (Tex. 1841).
37. Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 651. In Cropper, the supreme court confronted the apparent
conflict between article V, section 6 and article I, section 15, which provides for the right to
trial by jury. Id. at 647-49. It then determined that the intermediate appellate court's review
of cases for factual sufficiency does not conflict with the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id.
at 647. In concluding its discussion on the question, the court said that, "Aside from the
inescapable fact that this court cannot amend the constitution, we are not prepared to sacrifice
either for the benefit of the other." Id. at 652.
38. 591 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
39. Id. at 854. The appellant in White contended that the jury's verdict at his competency hearing was contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id.
40. Id. at 855.
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manifestly unjust, regardless of whether there is evidence of probative
force to support it. This is the standard of review requested .... This
court has no jurisdiction to do what the appellant requests as would a
Court of Civil Appeals because of a somewhat peculiar constitutional
provision applicable to Courts of Civil Appeals. Article V, § 6 (Courts
of Civil Appeals), states in part: "Provided, that the decision of said
courts shall be conclusive
on all questions of fact brought before them
41
on appeal or error."

The court continued at length to explain why it could not exercise
fact jurisdiction before concluding that: "After an examination of the
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the jurisdiction of
the court of criminal appeals, we conclude that this court has no fact
jurisdiction as do the Courts of Civil Appeals, and cannot 'unfind' a

vital fact finding by a jury. ' 42 Effective September 1, 1981, with the
amendment to article V, section 6, the court of criminal appeals apparently changed its mind about the unique fact jurisdiction vested in
the courts of appeals.4 3

2.

Opposition to Vesting Criminal Jurisdiction in Intermediate
Courts of Appeals

Perhaps the change in attitude resulted from a reluctance on the

part of the court of criminal appeals to accept the reality of the passage of the 1980 amendment. Members of that court have been called
intensely possessive of the criminal law as they have defined it.4 Historically, the judges of that court have not favored measures such as

the legislative efforts in the early 1970s to reform the Texas Penal
Code and they opposed the 1975 proposed constitutional amendment

of article V. 45 And it is fair to say that at least some of the members
41. Id.
42. White, 591 S.W.2d at 856.
43. This being when the courts of appeals were vested with criminal jurisdiction.
44. Paul Burka, Trial by Technicality, TEXAS MONTHLY, Apr. 1982 at 127, 127-28, 216.
Burka maintains that the result of the court of criminal appeals' specializing in criminal cases
is that it is often unable to deal practically or realistically with the law. See id. at 127, 216.
Burka states that: "[T]he court frequently insists on applying highly technical, formalistic
rules of law that have no relation to individual rights or, equally important, common sense."
Id. at 127.
45. Id.; see John F. Onion, Jr., The Proposed Constitution: What's Wrong with Article V,
VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE,

Fall-Winter 1975 at 2, 2-3 (discussing various objections to the

proposed amendment). Judge Onion expressed the opinion that, by allowing the intermediate
appellate courts to review criminal cases, appeals would be delayed, unnecessary appellate
judgeships would be created, and the independence of the judiciary would be challenged. Id.
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of that court did not welcome the 1980 constitutional amendment

with open arms. 46
3.

Reluctance Since 1980 to Accept Intermediate Courts' Role

After the courts of appeals were granted criminal jurisdiction, the
court of criminal appeals found, for the first time, that it was not the
only court in Texas empowered to review criminal cases on appeal.
Already unable to cooperate productively with the Texas Supreme
Court,4 7 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was perhaps not ready

to share its exclusivity over criminal cases. In any event, following
September 1, 1981, when the court of criminal appeals was again
46. See Amendment 8, 43 TEX. B.J. 908, 908-18 (1980) (discussions "for" and "against"
amendment 8 to amend article V and change names of courts of civil appeals and grant those
courts criminal jurisdiction). Former Chief Justice Robert W. Calvert of the Texas Supreme
Court and Dallas County Criminal District Attorney Henry Wade favored the amendment.
Id. at 910-14. Attorneys James L. Branton and Charles D. Butts were against it. Id. at 91518. Interestingly, the arguments previously advanced by Presiding Judge John Onion of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals appear in Butts' opposition to the 1980 proposed amendment. Both Onion and Butts urged that the proposed amendments would lengthen "the delay
in disposing of criminal appeals"; cause "the creation of numerous additional appellate judgeships"; add a "second step" in the criminal appellate process; and result in a loss of appellate
"specialization" in criminal cases. Commenting on the purposes behind the amendment to
improve the judicial system, both Onion and Butts cautioned that, "A reform is not a reform if
it does not solve or remedy the problems at hand." Compare John F. Onion, Jr., The Proposed
Constitution: What's Wrong with Article V, VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE, Fall-Winter 1975 at 2,
2-3 with Amendment 8, 43 TEX. B.J. 908, 917-18 (1980). A fair deduction would be that the
views expressed by Butts in 1980 represented those of Judge Onion also.
47. The fact that the two high courts did not work together sufficiently in order to adopt
a uniform set of rules of evidence for civil and criminal cases demonstrates the separate identities that the courts have maintained. See, e.g., Jack Pope, Foreword to HULEN D. WENDORF
& DAVID A. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at xvii (1988) (discussing
background of adoption of two different sets of rules of evidence). Initially, in 1980, the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee rejected recommendations that Texas adopt a uniform
set of rules of evidence. Id.; see also Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence-A Proposed
Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 1016 (1977) (authoritative codification particularly helpful since
rules must often be hastily applied). In 1981, the Texas Senate adopted a resolution that joined

members of the supreme court, the legislature, and the state bar in a working group to produce
an evidence code to be promulgated under the court's rule-making powers. Jack Pope, Foreword to HULEN D. WENDORF & DAVID A. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL

at xvii (1988). That group at first proposed a single set of rules that integrated both the

civil and criminal rules of evidence. The criminal law section of the state bar opposed the

proposal. The group, therefore, eliminated the criminal rules and recommended the adoption
of a code of civil evidence. Id. The Texas Supreme Court promulgated the Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence in November of 1982. After the court of criminal appeals was granted rulemaking authority, that court adopted the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence in December of
1985. Id.
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called upon to interpret article V, section 6, that court went awry.
Rather than view the article V, section 6 constitutional mandate as a
restriction upon its authority by confining its jurisdiction to questions
of law and not of fact, the court of criminal appeals seems to have
taken the view that, in criminal cases, all issues are questions of law.

B.

Early Decisions
1. Combs v. State

The 1982 Combs v. State48 decision represents the first misstep
taken by the court of criminal appeals. In that case, a jury convicted
Combs of murder.49 On appeal, Combs contended that the State had
not proven the cause of death. ° The court of appeals agreed and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.5 ' In reviewing the
lower appellate court's decision, the court of criminal appeals first had
to determine whether it had jurisdiction to review questions of sufficiency of the evidence once they had been passed on by a court of
52
appeals, in light of the article V, section 6 conclusivity provision.
The court acknowledged that if sufficiency of the evidence is a question of fact, then decisions of the courts of appeals on sufficiency questions "would appear to be binding" on it.53 With that
acknowledgment made, the court proceeded to review decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court that had interpreted article V, section 6.
48. 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
49. Id. at 710.
50. Combs v. State, 631 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'd, 643
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
51. Id. at 537-38. Combs, who was mentally retarded, gave conflicting accounts of what
had occurred. Id. at 535. At one point, he stated that he held the deceased, a two-year-old
child, under the water in the bathtub. Later, he said that he left her alone in the tub to search
for her clothing and that after the incident she seemed fine. He put her to bed and found her
dead the next day. Id. In addition to Combs' conflicting testimony, two of the victim's siblings testified that, after Combs took the child out of the tub, she seemed fine and that she had
stood and walked prior to Combs putting her to bed. Id. at 538. A pathologist who testified
that the cause of death was drowning stated that he came to that conclusion based on his
autopsy and a report furnished to him that "a suspect drowned the child in a bathtub." He
further stated that had he received information that the victim stood and walked after the
incident, he might have found a different cause of death, such as heart attack. The court of
appeals reviewed all of this evidence and concluded that the trial court should have granted a
mistrial. Id.
52. Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (citing TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 6).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 714-15 (decisions of supreme court examined to determine intent of framers
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The Combs court first reviewed In re King's Estate55 noting that
this decision is still followed. 5 6 The court then recognized that in civil
cases the supreme court apparently exercises authority over no evidence or legally insufficient points of error, but that decisions of the
courts of appeals are conclusive over factually insufficient or against

the great weight points.5 7 The court acknowledged that in deciding
the latter types of points, a court of appeals does not find a fact, it
"only 'unfinds' a vital fact."5 " The court gave no explanation as to
why the role of the courts of appeals would not function that same
way in reviewing criminal cases under the identical constitutional
provision.
Contrasting its role with that of courts of appeals, the court said
that, "[Olurcourt does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the weight
and preponderance of the evidence or 'unfind' a vital fact." 59 Then it
said it had never passed on the weight and preponderance of the evi6
dence, evincing a misperception with footnote 1 of the opinion. 0
That footnote pronounced, simply, "We perceive no other standard
may be utilized by the Court of Appeals in reviewing criminal convictions other than sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction,"
meaning the same legal sufficiency standard applied by the court of
criminal appeals. 6' Why the court could not accept that the courts of

of amended version of article V, section 6 as it applied to question before court). The court
pointed out that the only change in the amended version that was significant to the determination of the issue before it was that the earlier version applied to the courts of civil appeals,
which did not have criminal jurisdiction, and the current version applies to the courts of appeals, which now have criminal, as well as civil, jurisdiction. Id. The court then quoted TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1820, as it was amended in 1981, which provided that the judgments of those courts are to be "conclusive in all cases on the facts of the case." Combs, 643
S.W.2d at 714-15; see also Act of June 8, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 291, § 39, 1981 Tex. Gen.
Laws 761, 781, repealed by Act of June 12, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 22.225, 1985 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1721, 1730-31 (current version at TEX GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225 (Vernon 1988).
55. 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
56. Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Combs cited a recent
Texas Supreme Court decision reaffirming the holding in In re King's Estate. Id. (citing Hall v.
Villareal, 522 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. 1975)).
57. Combs, 643 S.W.2d at 715.
58. Id. at 716 (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence"
Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 368 (1960)). The court noted Justice Calvert's article is
"cited almost as frequently as In re King's Estate" in regard to appellate court fact jurisdiction.
Id.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id, at 716 n.1.
61. Combs, 643 S.W.2d at 714.
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appeals might function differently from the court of criminal appeals
is not apparent. It would seem that the court might have perceived
that the courts of appeals could be conclusive on factually insufficient
points or points against the great weight much as they had been in
civil cases under the same constitutional provision. 62 But such a notion, logical and sensible as it may be, apparently was not considered
by the court. Rather, the court said that sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain criminal convictions "as determined by this Court is a question of law," not one of fact.6 3 Thus, the court held that it had jurisdiction to review sufficiency of the evidence questions, completely
oblivious to the idea that there may be a distinction between evidence
64
that is legally insufficient from that which is factually insufficient.
The court proceeded to review the evidence concerning cause of
death, disagreed with the court of appeals, and reversed. 65 This decision began a period of differing views on the meaning of section 6
between the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas on the one hand, and

62. See, e.g., Harmon v. Sohio PipeLine Co., 623 S.W.2d 314, 314 (Tex. 1981) (well settled that supreme court has no jurisdiction to review question of factual sufficiency of evidence); Glover v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. 1981) (supreme court
may not review sufficiency of evidence); Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 580 S.W.2d 340,
340 (Tex. 1979) (court without jurisdiction to pass on fact question of great weight and preponderance of evidence); Tippett v. Brannon, 493 S.W.2d 511, 511 (Tex. 1973) (supreme court
may not pass on fact questions of sufficiency of evidence or great weight and preponderance of
evidence).
63. Combs, 643 S.W.2d at 716. The court went on to say that it was irrelevant whether it
believed certain evidence or believed that evidence presented on behalf of a defendant outweighed the state's evidence. The only question properly before the court was whether there
was any evidence which established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
whether the trier of fact believed that evidence. If so, the court stated that it could not reverse
the judgment on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient. Id.
64. See id. See generally William Cornelius, Appellate Review of Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenges in Civil and Criminal Cases, 46 TEX. B.J. 439 (1983). Legal insufficiency of
the evidence means that there is no evidence to support a finding or that a certain issue of fact
is conclusively established or that a finding of fact is only supported by a scintilla of evidence.
Id. at 440. Factual insufficiency exists when the evidence in support of a finding is factually
too weak to support it or, when weighed against the opposing evidence, the finding is so
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Id. at
441.
65. Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). The court of criminal
appeals, after reviewing all of the evidence in the case and after discussing the standard of
review employed by the supreme court, concluded that sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
criminal convictions was a question of law and not a "question of fact" under article V, section
6 of the Texas Constitution. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to review questions
of sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction even in those cases where the
question had already been addressed by the courts of appeals. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/4

16

Bleil and Bleil: The Court of Criminal Appeals Versus the Constitution: The Conclu

1991]

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

on the other hand, the Supreme Court of Texas and those courts of
appeals which were called upon to address the issue.
2.

Van Guilder v. State66

Several years later, in Van Guilder v. State, the court of criminal
appeals again decided to address the issue because it recognized that
the proper standard of review in criminal cases was muddled. Opening its discussion on the issue, the court noted: "There appears to be
substantial confusion in the Courts of Appeals over the proper standard of review in criminal cases. This is due to their reading of Art. 5,
Sec. 6 of the Texas Constitution and a recent decision of this Court,
Combs v. State. 67
The court continued, acknowledging that, "It is true that as
amended, Art. 5, Sec. 6 of the Texas Constitution reads, 'that the decisions of said Courts [courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all
questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error.' ",68 Then
the court held that under its decision in Combs, the Texas Constitution did not mean what it says. 69 The court indicated that it could not
allow "the courts of appeals to evaluate the facts." 70 Combs, it said,
66. 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
67. Id. at 180 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6); see also Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709,
715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
68. Van Guilder, 709 S.W.2d at 180 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6).
69. See id. (decision in Combs did not dictate that courts of appeals be granted fact jurisdiction). The court relied on the 1981 amendment to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1820 as
well as its own opinion in Combs to support its determination that article V, section 6 of the
constitution was inapplicable in criminal cases. The court went on to state that the Combs
opinion did not grant fact jurisdiction to the courts of appeals, and, therefore, those courts
were not permitted to evaluate the facts of a case. Id.
70. Van Guilder, 709 S.W.2d at 180. The court said that the effect of allowing a court of
appeals to reverse a conviction in a criminal case, if it determined that a jury finding is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, would be to usurp the function of the
jury. The result of allowing these courts to review a case and to determine that the evidence is
factually insufficient would make them a "thirteenth juror with veto power." The court then
stated that "neither the Texas Constitution nor Combs" supports that standard of review. Id.
In making its determination that the Texas Constitution does not support the courts of
appeals' sitting as a "thirteenth juror," the court of criminal appeals surely overlooked about
one hundred years of decisions to the contrary by the Texas Supreme Court. See, e.g., Cropper
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988) (when court of appeals properly
concludes jury verdict is against great weight of evidence, returning case for retrial before
different jury does not violate right to trial by jury); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629,
634 (Tex. 1986) (court of appeals "unfinding" fact not an unconstitutional usurpation of right
to trial by jury); Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., 91 Tex. 406, 410, 44 S.W. 69, 69 (1898)
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did not "grant" the courts of appeals fact jurisdiction.7
The court expressed the opinion that the confusion demonstrated
by the court of appeals in Van Guilder stemmed from the fact that the
defendant relied on an affirmative defense.7 2 The court explained that
in such cases, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.7 3 The court proceeded to
establish a separate standard of review when facts concerning an affirmative defense are under consideration; the courts of appeals were
to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the implicit finding of the jury respecting the affirmative defense and then determine,
by examining all the evidence, whether any rational trier of fact could
have found that the defendant failed to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.74 With this pronouncement, the court apparently envisioned that it had laid the matter to rest.
(court of appeals empowered with "unique" authority to review jury finding and reverse judgment and remand for new trial).
Although there has been considerable discussion and disagreement as to how article V, section 6 can best be harmonized with article I, section 15, which provides that "the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate," the supreme court has, time and again, maintained that article
V, section 6 means precisely what it says, that decisions of the courts of appeals are conclusive
on all questions of fact. See, e.g., Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 651; Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634; In re
King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 666, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951); Choate, 44 S.W.2d at 69.
71. See Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986). This assumes, apparently, that court of criminal appeals might somehow have authority to "grant jurisdiction" to courts of appeals.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 180-81 (when defendant relies on affirmative defense, burden of proof is different than when he raises any other defense). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04(d)
(Vernon 1974) (defendant required to prove affirmative defense by preponderance of evidence)
with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03(d) (Vernon 1974) (court required to charge jury that
reasonable doubt as to existence of a defense requires acquittal). See generally GERALD S.
REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN TEXAS 110 (1987) (detailing differences
between defenses and affirmative defenses). When a defense is raised by the defendant, the
burden of persuasion remains with the prosecution. The defendant must only raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact in order to be acquitted. Id. In the case of an
affirmative defense, however, the defendant is required to convince the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the affirmative defense. Id. at 111.
74. Van Guilder, 709 S.W.2d at 181. The court specifically limited the courts of appeals
to reviewing only the evidence submitted on the issue of the affirmative defense in question.
The courts of appeals are to review the evidence in this manner when a defendant asserts on
appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he adequately proved
his affirmative defense. The court further emphasized that "this analysis does not involve the
appellate court in any fact finding function." The court further clarified what it considered to
be the appropriate parameters of the courts of appeals' review by stating that those courts are
not to reweigh or reclassify the evidence. Id. The appellate court is restricted to determining
if the jury finding on the issue of the affirmative defense in question was rational. Id. at 182.
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3.

Schuessler v. State7 5

Three years later, in Schuessler v. State, the court of criminal appeals continued on the route it had established in Combs.76 Schuessler
involved a review of the jury's rejection of an insanity defense. The
court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant
had established his defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 77 Approaching the case chiefly on the basis of facts which are set out in the
opinion, the court of appeals noted that the State had presented no
evidence of sanity and that there was substantial evidence of insanity,
and, therefore, determined that the jury's implicit rejection of insanity
was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.78
The court of criminal appeals, after outlining the evidence, disagreed,
noting that the court of appeals improperly evaluated the weight and
credibility of the evidence on the insanity question.79 It then reiterated the pronouncements of Van Guilder,80 proceeded to apply those
standards, and found that a rational trier of fact could have resolved
the conflicting testimony against the defendant.81
These cases reflect the initial approach taken by the court of criminal appeals regarding the meaning of the conclusivity provision of article V, section 6. Interestingly, by the time the court decided
Schuessler, it saw fit not to mention the constitutional provision which
lies at the heart of the controversy over intermediate appellate court
review of the facts in criminal cases.

75. 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
76. Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
77. Schuessler v. State, 647 S.W.2d 742, 749 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983), rev'd, 719
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

78. See id.
79. Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In reversing the El
Paso court's decision, the court stated that it could understand that the court of appeals might
disagree with the jury's resolution of conflicts in the evidence. Id. However, the effect of that
court interfering with the jury's verdict would be that of acting as a "thirteenth juror with veto
power." Id. at 330 (citing Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986)).
80. Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.

1169 (1986).
81. Schuessler, 719 S.W.2d at 330. While holding that the court of appeals did not have
authority to review factual sufficiency, the court of criminal appeals stated, "We find that a

rational trier of fact could have resolved the conflicting testimony on legal insanity against
appellant." Id.
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Courts of Appeals Decisions

In Combs8 2 the court of criminal appeals indicated that the courts
of appeals appeared to be confused about the proper standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. However, shortly after its pronouncement, the Combs decision itself was soundly criticized.1 3 Chief
Justice Carlos Cadena of the San Antonio Court of Appeals wrote in
Minor v. State84 that the holding in Combs-that a court of appeals
lacked authority to reverse a criminal conviction when it determined
that such a conviction was against the overwhelming preponderance
of the evidence-indicated "a clear misinterpretation of TEX. CONST.
''
art. V, § 6. 15
Justice Cadena then demonstrated why the Combs decision reflected a misinterpretation of article V, section 6. His reasoning was
laid out in the following manner. Before the 1980 amendment, article
V, section 6 applied only in civil cases.16 The 1980 amendment expanded the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts.8 7 The
critical section of that amendment makes decisions of the courts of
appeals "conclusive on all questions of fact brought before" them. 8
Before 1980, the Texas Supreme Court had consistently held that an
intermediate court's decision was final on questions of factual sufficiency of the evidence-or questions of great weight and preponderance of the evidence.8 9 Justice Cadena noted that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, had consistently concluded that it could
not consider questions of factual sufficiency of the evidence. The
82. Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
83. See Minor v. State, 653 S.W.2d 349, 351-55 (Tex. App.-San Antonio) (Cadena, C.J.,
concurring) (concurring in result only because question of whether finding of appellant's guilt
was against great weight and preponderance of evidence was not before the court), pet. ref'd
per curiam, 657 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
84. 653 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), pet. ref'd per curiam, 657 S.W.2d 811
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
85. Id. at 351.
86. Id.; see also Tex. S.J. Res. 45, § 1, 65th Leg., R.S., 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 3336, 3336
(adopted in 1978 as TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6.
87. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 351.; see also Tex. S.J. Res. 36, §§ 5-6, 66th Leg., R.S., 1979
Tex. Gen. Laws 3223, 3224-25 (adopted in 1980 as TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6) (providing for
appeal of criminal cases to intermediate courts).
88. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352. This provision was in the 1891 constitutional provision
and has been in each amendment since then. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1891, amended 1978,
1980, 1985).
89. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352 (Cadena, C.J. concurring) (citing In re King's Estate, 150
Tex. 662, 666, 244 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1951)).
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court of criminal appeals recognized that it had no fact jurisdiction,
that is, no power to unfind facts or pass upon the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence, as did the courts of civil appeals. 90
Justice Cadena observed that the distinction between the fact jurisdiction of the two appellate courts was that the jurisdiction of the court
of criminal appeals was not defined by a constitutional provision that
paralleled the language of article V, section 6, which defines the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. 91
As noted by Justice Cadena, the court of criminal appeals, before
the 1980 amendment giving courts of appeals criminal jurisdiction,
had conceded as to the distinction between its jurisdiction and that of
the intermediate appellate courts. 92 Justice Cadena quoted the assurance given by the court of criminal appeals in the Combs decision that
"[ilt is [thus] clear that the phrase 'questions of fact' is, in the context
of Art. 5, Sec. 6, a legal term of art signifying 'questions of weight and
preponderance of the evidence.' "93 He then reviewed the court of
appeals' decision in Combs to demonstrate that the intermediate court
had obviously found the evidence factually insufficient to prove the
offense charged. 94 By finding that the evidence was insufficient and by
remanding the case for a new trial as opposed to directing an acquittal, the court of appeals did not hold that there was no evidence or
legally insufficient evidence. On the contrary, it found factually insufficient evidence, Justice Cadena observed, noting that a remand for
new trial would have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution had the court found the evidence legally
insufficient. 95
90. Id. at 352 (citing Martin v. State, 605 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
91. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352.
92. White v. State, 591 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (lacked jurisdiction to
consider complaint that verdict was against great weight and preponderance of evidence as
could courts of civil appeals); Martin, 605 S.W.2d at 261 (concluding no fact jurisdiction based

on examination, by that court, of constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to its jurisdiction); see also Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352 (before 1980 amendment court of criminal appeals

consistently held it had no power to consider questions of fact).
93. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352 (quoting Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982)).
94. See Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 353 (Cadena, C. J., concurring) (review of Houston court
opinion demonstrates its dissatisfaction with judgment of conviction); see also Combs v. State,
631 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]) (inconsistencies in testimony of witnesses led to conclusion by court of appeals that state had not proven cause of death), rev'd,
643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
95. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 352-53; see also Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978) (sec-
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On the other hand, Justice Cadena added, when a conviction is supported by some evidence but is found by an appellate court to be
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, a remand
for a new trial is appropriate. 96 Justice Cadena indicated that the
court of criminal appeals might be paying lip service to the article V,
section 6 constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals.
He observed that, "Since, as the Court of Criminal Appeals recognizes in Combs, the phrase 'questions of fact' as used in § 6, signifies
questions concerning weight and preponderance of the evidence, it appears that Combs fails to give the decision of the Houston Court that
finality and conclusiveness which is clearly mandated by
§ 6." 9 7Although the court of criminal appeals subsequently referred
to Justice Cadena's opinion as "thoughtful" and noted that the question he raised had been given little attention, the court initially
demonstrated an absence of open-mindedness.9"
ond trial precluded by Double Jeopardy Clause once reviewing court determines evidence at
trial insufficient to support verdict); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978) (Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial once reviewing court finds evidence insufficient).
96. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 354; see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982) (Double
Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial when reversal based on weight of evidence).
97. Minor, 653 S.W.2d at 354.
98. See generally Minor v. State, 657 S.W.2d 811, 811-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Quoting extensively from the Texas Bar Journal, the court hinted that the matter was simply overlooked, that those responsible for the constitutional changes were unaware of what they were
doing, and had the effect of the changes been known, the outcome might have been different.
So that there is no mistake about what was indicated, footnote 1 in the per curiam opinion in
Minor v. State is set out verbatim:
Perhaps as a constitutional problem the matter was simply overlooked. For example,
former Chief Justice Calvert discerned:
"The change of real significance is in appellate court jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Whereas appeals in all criminal cases are now to the court of criminal appeals, only
appeals in death sentence cases will be to the court of criminal appeals if this amendment is adopted, and all others will be to the intermediate courts ... to be renamed
Court of Appeals, with subsequent review by the court of criminal appeals as may be
provided by law." [citation omitted]
And in urging that time is of the essence, Chief Justice Calvert thought that after the
amendment was adopted all that remained "to stop the overflow of cases to the court of
criminal appeals will be delineation by the regular session of Legislature in 1971 [sic] of
the respective jurisdictions of the courts of appeals and the court of criminal appeals,"
[citation omitted]
For his part, Honorable Henry Wade saw sound conceptual changes in the prospective
roles of the respective appellate courts, viz:
"The role of the court of criminal appeals would be to fix or change policy and
precedent. The role of the Courts of Appeals would be to apply those precedents to the
record on appeal. Separating the precedent making function from the precedent following function is conceptually sound." . . .
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Following decisions of the court of criminal appeals in Van Guilder,99 Schuessler,' °° and other cases, the intermediate courts continued to demonstrate dismay at the higher court's view of the section 6
conclusivity provision. In 1986, two courts of appeals' decisions vehemently criticized the high court's decisions.
The El Paso Court of Appeals in Meraz v. State' 0 was presented
with an assigned error that a jury's finding of competency to stand
trial for criminal charges was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 102 The State argued that on the basis of authorities such as Van Guilder and Schuessler, this was a fact question
which the court lacked jurisdiction to consider. 103 Chief Justice Stephen Preslar, before examining the court's fact jurisdiction, expressed
the dilemma facing all courts of appeals: "The courts of appeals are
caught in a conflict between those holdings of the court of criminal
appeals and the legion of cases to the contrary by the Supreme Court
of Texas.'1° Noting that in article V of the Texas Constitution, sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively, delineate the jurisdictions of the three
separate appellate courts, Preslar wrote that each portion of the constitution is equal to the other and that no portion can be ignored.' 0
In a bold manner, the court proceeded to emphasize persuasively
that the courts of appeals are granted exclusive fact jurisdiction; that
The opponents, James L. Branton, Esq. and Charles D. Butts, Esq., expressed concerns
more about practical effects of the proposed changes than such technical matters now
raised by Chief Justice Cadena. [citation omitted]
Not one of those distinguished advocates so much as hinted at the prospect of a conviction in a criminal case being set aside by a court of appeals upon a determination that the
judgment "is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
manifestly unjust-this regardless of whether the record contains some 'evidence of probative force' in support of the verdict." In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d
660, 661 (1951). Indeed, given that understanding, one or more might well have switched
sides.
Minor, 657 S.W.2d at 811, n. 1 (quoting Robert W. Calvert, For Amendment No. 8, 43 TEX.
B.J. 910, 910-11 (1980) and Henry Wade, For Amendment No. 8, 43 TEX. B.J. 912, 914-918
(1980)).
99. 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
100. 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
101. 714 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), aff'd, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990).
102. Id. at 109 (principal question before court was proper standard of review on issue of
competency).
103. See id. at 111 (state contended court lacked jurisdiction to consider great weight and
preponderance questions when case involved affirmative defense of insanity).
104. Id.
105. Meraz, 714 S.W.2d at 111-12 (jurisdiction of courts spelled out in constitution).
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in Texas a criminal defendant is entitled to challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence; that the legislature cannot withdraw jurisdiction given to a court by the constitution; and that the reasoning by the
court of criminal appeals in the Minor and Van Guilder decisionsthat legislative enactments were intended to alter the constitution-is
facially fallacious. 106 Significantly, although the court of appeals discussed the differing burdens between proving facts in a criminal trial
in chief, and proving affirmative defenses to criminal charges and establishing mental competency to stand trial, the court in no manner
expressed an opinion that the constitutional grant of authority to the
courts of appeals to review factual questions 10would
be affected by the
7
arises.
question
factual
the
setting in which
106. Id. at 112. So compelling is Preslar's writing that it is appropriate to quote. He
wrote:
The fact finding jurisdiction is lodged in the courts of appeals. It is an affirmative grant of
jurisdiction. When the constitution expressly grants jurisdiction over a particular subject
matter to a particular court and not to another, then it is presumed that the jurisdiction so
conferred is exclusive. The defendant is entitled to this review of the sufficiency of the
evidence under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the constitution and we are bound to
afford him a review of his point of error. It is a due process right as such is defined. Nor
can it be altered or changed by legislative enactments as is reasoned in Minor v. State and
Van Guilder. This, because the legislature cannot withdraw jurisdiction given a court by
the constitution.
The provision of Article 5, Section 6, has been a part of our constitution since 1891.
Twice, the citizens of this state have in the process of amending the constitution reenacted
or retained it. Importantly, these reenactments have come with and since the courts of
appeals were given criminal jurisdiction. An even more important fact is that the last
reenactment came (November 1985) at a time when it served to ratify three courts of
appeals cases holding that the courts of appeals had jurisdiction to consider great weight
and preponderance of the evidence questions in cases involving the affirmative defense of
insanity. Van Guilder v. State, Schuessler v. State, and Baker v. State are the cases involved. These cases were on the books and a known part of our jurisprudence when the
electorate reenacted Article 5, Section 6, in November, 1985. Thus, the electorate gave its
approval of the court of appeals' application of Article 5, Section 6, provisions to the
criminal law. It is a principle of law that such action by the electorate shows that no
departure from that practice was intended. We conclude that the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals to consider the fact question of the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence in this instance exists by the terms of the constitution independent of court
decisions.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 114-15. In passing the court observed:
The Texas system of split jurisdiction of appeals between the criminal and civil creates
problems, except for the fact that the courts of appeals have this fact finding constitutional authority. One is reminded of the saying "Jack Sprat could eat no fat, his wife
could eat no lean, so between the two of them, they licked the platter clean." The
Supreme Court and the court of criminal appeals are forbidden to eat from the same
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Next to assail the logic of the court of criminal appeals decisions
interpreting section 6 was the Tyler Court of Appeals. In 1985, in
Hill v. State,"°8 the Tyler court delivered an opinion in a probation
revocation proceeding." °9 The court concluded that "the trial court's

finding that John Hill had the ability to pay probation fees and court
costs was so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust."" 0 In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence as to Hill's affirmative defense of inability
to pay, the court of appeals applied the standard of review mandated
by the Supreme Court of Texas.'' The court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to it for reconsideration under the Van Guilder standard. 1 2 In doing so, that court
observed that it had previously held that courts of appeals do not have
jurisdiction to consider great weight and preponderance questions in
cases involving affirmative defenses." 3 The Tyler Court of Appeals
noted that its initial decision in 1985 was after the court of criminal
appeals' decisions in Combs and Minor, but before that court's decisions in Baker, Schuessler, and Arnold in 1986.' 11 Quoting from Van

platter, but the dual jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in civil and criminal matters
takes care of the situation. The due process rights of defendants are protected in that they
can get review of all aspects of their trial. Due process might be lacking in such instance
if final authority on fact questions were not lodged in the court of appeals. It would seem
to be in keeping with the new rules jointly covering civil and criminal matters if the court
of criminal appeals, where possible, would review courts of appeals' opinions in the same
manner that they are reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Id.
108. 718 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985), rev'd, 719 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986).
109. Id. at 752.
110. Id. at 755 (reversed and remanded).
111. Id. at 754-55 (following In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951)).
112. Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
113. Id. at 201; see also Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985) (courts of appeals not allowed to reweigh or reclassify evidence in case involving affirmative defense), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
114. Hill v. State, 721 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no pet.) (court of appeals
reconsideration under review standard of Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986)). The Baker and Arnold decisions mentioned refer to Baker v. State, 707 S.W.2d 893
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) and Arnold v. State, 719 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In
Baker, the court held that the court of appeals erred in failing to follow the correct standard
which was announced in Van Guilder v. State (decided after the court of appeals' decision in
Baker). Baker, 707 S.W.2d at 894. The court again rejected the argument that courts of
appeals can consider great weight and preponderance of the evidence fact questions in cases
involving the affirmative defense of insanity. Id. Arnold was similar, but involved review of
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Guilder, Justice Colley wrote for the Tyler court that:
As is obvious, the real holding by the court of criminal appeals in Van
Guilder and Hill is that the Texas Courts of Appeals do not have jurisdiction to consider great weight and preponderance of the evidence fact
questions in criminal cases ....
That holding appears to be in direct
conflict with the plain wording of Tex. Const. art. 5, § 6.15

The opinion continued the attack on the foundation for the court of
criminal appeals' construction of section 6 by urging that all of that
court's decisions going back to Combs simply ignore section 6 as it
applies to the courts of appeals. 1 6 Once again, it was pointed out that
whether the Texas Constitution gave the court of criminal appeals

fact jurisdiction was irrelevant to that court's consideration of the
meaning of section 6 as it applies to the courts of appeals.' 7 Ultimately, the Tyler court applied the standard mandated by Van Guilder and again reversed the order revoking probation." 8
These decisions by the courts of appeals are representative of the
numerous criticisms launched by those courts." 9 The court of crimiproof of competency to stand trial. Arnold, 719 S.W.2d at 592. In Arnold, the court said that
the standard in such cases was the same as in review of insanity defense cases. Id.
115. Hill, 721 S.W.2d at 954.
116. Id. at 955. Justice Colley went further, saying:
Certainly the High Court may establish definitions of evidentiary sufficiency to be applied
in appellate review agreeable to the state constitution, but not one which flies in the face
of the plain, strong words of section 6 or one which operates to strip away a convicted
defendant's state constitutional right to seek a new trial in the intermediate appellate
courts of this state on the ground that the finding of guilt is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 955-56.
117. Id. at 956. Justice Colley persuasively made the point. He stated that:
The historical fact that the court of criminal appeals has never had "fact" jurisdiction
certainly should not be a consideration in the determination of whether the courts of
appeals, since September 1, 1981, have had jurisdiction under section 6 to reverse any
findings made by a judge or jury in criminal cases when that finding is so contrary to the
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust ....
The
fact that the burden of proof for conviction or a finding of guilt is [proof] beyond a reasonable doubt instead of by a preponderance of the evidence provides no basis for such a
distinction. Tibbs v. Florida,[ 457 U.S. 31 (1982)]. Said another way, logically, a finding
of guilt based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard could be found on appellate
review to be against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence just as a finding,
or refusal to find, that an affirmative defense exists or that a defendant is competent based
on the "preponderance of the evidence" standard can be found on review to be against the
great weight and preponderance.
Id.
118. Id. at 957.
119. See Barber v. State, 773 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989) (urging re-
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nal appeals has had numerous opportunities to fully alter the path it
chose in Combs, but as yet has not done so. The tack taken by that
court, while indicating room for optimism that section 6 may ultimately be construed to mean what it says, has been more of a course
alteration than it has been a course correction. In the meantime, the
courts of appeals are required to parry challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence with court of criminal appeals' decisions which
1 20
lack the rationality equal to that found in the challenges.
consideration of Combs bar to appellate court fact determination in criminal cases), pet.
dism'd, improvidently granted, State v. Barber, 802 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). After
reviewing the constitutional background of the conclusivity issue, the court of appeals looked
at other courts of appeals' decisions as well as those of the court of criminal appeals and
concluded that the court of criminal appeals needed to look again at its Combs decision. Discussing article V, section 6, the court said, "This constitutional grant of authority plainly
appears to (1) grant the courts of appeals authority to review questions of fact brought to
them, and (2) prohibit any other court in the state from interfering with those courts' exercise
of that constitutional duty." Id. at 634. The court of appeals asked the court of criminal
appeals to review this issue. It said, "We agree that Combs, insofar as it interprets Article V,
§ 6 of the Texas Constitution, should indeed be revisited without delay." Id. at 635. Although
the petition for discretionary review was granted in 1989, it ultimately was dismissed in 1991.
Thus, the court of criminal appeals effectively declined again to re-evaluate Combs. See State
v. Barber, 802 S.W.2d 696, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (declining to comment on language of
lower court); see also Cooney v. State, 803 S.W.2d 422, 423-25 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, pet.
ref'd) (more recent court of appeals decision expressing sound criticism of court of criminal
appeals' position on question).
120. Today, the courts of appeals are being asked to set aside convictions because the
evidence is factually insufficient. One recent example of such requests appears in a brief filed
by Randy Schaffer, a Houston attorney, in a case entitled Cook v. State, No. 6-90-068-CR
(Tex. App.-Texarkana, Mar. 26, 1991, pet. ref'd) (unpublished opinion). In Schaffer's brief,
after demonstrating that Combs should be considered to be of no effect, he cogently contended
that:
Decisions of the court of criminal appeals other than Meraz support the conclusion that
the court is prepared to reconsider Combs as it applies to the elements of the offense. In
Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), Judge Clinton, joined in dissent by
Presiding Judge Onion and McCormick, observed that Combs did not delineate the standard of review to be used by the court of appeals on direct appeal, and opined that permitting a reversal on a finding that a guilty verdict is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence will not violate due process. Id. at 203. In Gold v. State,
736 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), the majority observed that it might be inclined to
reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial if it had jurisdiction to pass on the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 690. In dissent, Judge Teague noted
that the issue was really whether the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to decide factual
sufficiency, asserted that he agreed with Judge Colley's analysis in Hill on remand and
observed that the time had come to reconsider Combs. Id. at 691, 699. Finally, in
Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), Judge Teague repeated his Gold
dissent, prompting Judge Clinton's concurring opinion, joined by Judge Duncan, which
suggested that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to pass on factual sufficiency. Id. at
872 n.5. Since Butler has already overruled part of Combs, and in view of the express
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As may be recalled, the initial response from the court of criminal
appeals to the criticism was to label it "thoughtful" and to ignore
it.' 21 The next several years saw the court of criminal appeals stand
firm in an attempt to justify its earlier position.
1. Meraz v. State 122 Creates Optimism
In 1990, the court indicated for the first time that perhaps it had
begun to read section 6 in a manner similar to the other Texas appellate courts. The court chose to review the court of appeals' decision
in Meraz and stated that it did so partly to:
extract the courts of appeals from the quagmire they "are caught in
[because of] a conflict between those holdings of the court of criminal
appeals [i.e., Van Guilder v. State; Schuessler v. State; and Arnold v.
State] and
the legion of cases to the contrary by the Supreme Court of
23
Texas."'

1

Initially the court observed that the issue had generated a substantial
amount of discord between it and the various courts of appeals and
called the culprit the conclusivity provision of section 6.'124 The court
reservation of this issue in Meraz, this court may properly conduct its own analysis of the
issue without feeling constrained by Combs.
Neither logic nor reason support the Combs holding that courts of appeals cannot consider factual sufficiency. Significant parts of Combs have been overruled in Butler and
Meraz, and the remainder hangs by a slender thread. Although article V, § 6 of the Texas
Constitution was amended once the courts of civil appeals acquired criminal jurisdiction,
it was not amended in such a manner as to deprive the courts of appeals from reviewing
factual sufficiency in criminal cases. It could have been amended to provide that "the
decisions of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on
appeal or error in civil cases." As written, it does not bar the courts of appeals from
considering factual sufficiency in criminal cases. An interpretation to the contrary renders the constitutional mandate meaningless in criminal cases and precludes appellate
courts from correcting serious miscarriages of justice which may arise when the evidence
preponderates against the conviction.
Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Cook v. State, No. 6-90-068-CR (Tex. App.-Texarkana, Mar.
26, 1991, pet. ref'd) (unpublished opinion).
121. See Minor v. State, 657 S.W.2d 811, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (referring to Chief
Justice Cadena's concurring opinion in lower court's decision).
122. 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
123. Id. at 147 (quoting Meraz v. State, 714 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986),
aff'd, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
124. Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 149. Judge Duncan, writing for the court, indicated that:
It is also appropriate to note that the issue in this case has generated a substantial amount
of discord between this Court and the various courts of appeals. The primary culprit in
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noticed that since 1891, when article V, section 6 granted the courts
of civil appeals jurisdiction to examine the facts, the Texas Supreme
Court had consistently held that the intermediate appellate courts had
the authority to determine whether findings were supported by adequate evidence; further, the court of criminal appeals had consistently
held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the evidence in a similar manner. 2 5 In a review of its Van Guilder,Schuessler, and Arnold
decisions, Judge Duncan, writing for the court, candidly demonstrated the folly of the rationale of the Van Guilder and Schuessler
decisions and wrote that the "concrete in which Arnold was set obviously flowed from" those decisions, and admitted that those three de1
cisions were erroneous. 26

In looking at those cases, Judge Duncan noted that they presented
fact questions concerning proof of an issue on which the defendant
has the burden of proof. 127 The court then discussed affirmative defenses and concluded that, "it is apparent therefore that a review of
the facts relative to proof of an affirmative defense does not inexorably
lead to a review of facts relative to proof of the elements of the offense."' 2 The holding in Meraz was that:

this larceny of confusion is one sentence in Art. V, § 6 of the Texas Constitution. The
relevant sentence states: "Provided, that the decision of said courts [courts of appeals]
shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error." Id.
Nearly a century ago, in Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry., the Texas Supreme Court
analyzed this sentence and interpreted it as follows: "The purpose of that provision to
amend section 6, art. 5, of the constitution ... was not to enlarge their [courts of civil
appeals'] power over questions of fact, but to restrict, in express terms, the jurisdiction of
the supreme court, and to confine it to questions of law.' " 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69, 69
(1898).
Id.
125. See id. (supreme court has held consistently that it has no jurisdiction to review
factual sufficiency of evidence).
126. Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 152.
127. Id. More or less, the court of criminal appeals in Meraz adopted Judge Clinton's
previously expressed views. The court said that:
Judge Clinton's perceptions in his dissenting opinion in Schuessler, at 330-31, now come
home to roost as they clearly demonstrate that the standard of review enunciated in Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)] is not a constitutional standard imperative to determining whether a defendant sustained his burden of proof in presenting an affirmative
defense. . . . While some form of appellate review of the evidentiary sufficiency of an
affirmative defense is necessary, it was not appropriate for this Court to create a standard
of review which is in conflict with the language of our State Constitution.
Id.
128. Id. at 153. The court then added that, "Although a defendant certainly is not foreclosed from requesting both reviews, the former does not incorporate the latter." Id.
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Consequently, this Court was not constitutionally authorized to adopt a
standard of review for the court of appeals concerning an evidentiary
review of the insanity defense which was inconsistent with Art. V, § 6,
of our Constitution. In doing so we interfered with the fact jurisdiction
of the intermediate appellate courts. 129
After this holding, the court proceeded to discuss instances in which a
defendant seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant
a conviction-not merely that relevant to an affirmative defense. The
court observed that the language of article V, section 6 has remained
essentially unchanged for a hundred years and reviewed relevant recent legislative and public actions.
It noted that in 1979 the legislature proposed that the court of civil
appeals become the court of appeals and be vested with intermediate
criminal jurisdiction. 3 0 This resolution passed at the general election
and became effective September 1, 1981. In two elections, within two
years, the public voted to confirm the authority of the court of appeals
to review factual sufficiency to the exclusion of the supreme court.
"[I]n 1985, the public again voted on Art. V, § 6, ... and again affirmed the language that the court of appeals' determination of fact
shall be conclusive."''
After further review of the Texas Supreme
Court's view of the conclusivity provision, the court announced that
courts of appeals have constitutional authority to determine whether
a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. At that point, the court of criminal appeals had patently expressed its agreement with the other appellate courts of Texas in
viewing section 6: the courts of appeals can review for factual sufficiency of the evidence. Regrettably, the court did not stop there.
Having written convincingly and having accurately pegged the constitutional role of the courts of appeals in reviewing questions of the
factual sufficiency of the evidence generally, the court inexplicably retreated from the position that had seemed obvious, even to it. The
court, in its penultimate paragraph, pointedly expressed no opinion
on the role of the courts of appeals in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence relative to the proof of the elements of the offense.' 32 Since
129. Id.

130. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 153 (Tex. Crirp. App. 1990); Tex. S.J. Res. 36, § 5,
66th Leg., R.S., 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 3223, 3224.
131. Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 153; Tex. S.J. Res. 14, § 2, 69th Leg., R.S., 1985 Tex. Gen

Laws 3351, 3356-57 (adopted as TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 in Nov., 1985).
132. Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 156.
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the Meraz decision, the court has not expressed such an opinion, leaving the courts of appeals in the same "quagmire" they were in-except as to the review of factual sufficiency of the evidence relating to
issues on which a defendant has the burden of proof.
2.

Optimism Fades

Hopes that Meraz may have meant all that it said, not just what it
held, were short-lived. In the same year that Meraz was decided, a
unanimous court gratuitously announced that an appellate court does
not engage in its own factual review of the evidence, relegating Meraz
33
to footnote status applicable only in very narrow circumstances.
V.
A.

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT-A PROPOSAL

The Need for a Uniform View of Article V,Section 6

By taking the view it has of the meaning of article V, section 6, the
court of criminal appeals has created an intolerable situation in which
the same constitutional mandate has two legal meanings within
Texas' legal system. This troublesome situation calls for a better,
more uniform reading of section 6.
Although the court of criminal appeals has said in the past that the
courts of appeals are "constitutionally given the authority to determine if a jury finding is against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence and if this is improper it is up to the people of the State
of Texas to amend the Constitution,"'134 it now seems to have withdrawn from that position. Having finally said that it too reads article
V,' section 6 to mean what it says with regard to the courts of appeals'
jurisdiction to review for factual sufficiency of the evidence, it currently limits that holding to those factual issues on which a defendant
has the burden of proof.
With regard to whether courts of appeals can review for factual
sufficiency of the evidence, that is, whether they can determine that a
finding of guilt of an offense is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the conflict between the court of criminal
appeals and the other appellate courts is as great as ever. Unless a
133. See Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (appellate court
only decides whether trial court's findings of fact are supported by record). If there is support
in the record for those findings, the court of appeals may not disturb them. Id.
134. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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court of appeals is reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence
relative to an issue on which a defendant has the burden of proof, the
law of Texas is still that a court of appeals-in deciding appeals in
criminal cases-is not conclusive on questions of fact; it cannot even
consider questions such as the factual sufficiency, as distinguished
13
from the legal sufficiency, of the evidence to support a verdict. 1
The court of criminal appeals has frequently been criticized. It has
been said that at times the court fails to give effect to the plain meaning of constitutional language. 3 6 It has also been said that the court
lacks common sense. 137 By and large, such attacks are not meritorious. Here, however, these two criticisms seem to describe perfectly
the court's view of article V, section 6; it shows a lack of common
sense and an unwillingness to give ordinary meaning to plain words.
By giving plain meaning to the constitution, the court can join all
other Texas appellate courts which read the ordinary words of article
V, section 6 in a uniform manner. Only when the court of criminal
appeals is willing to hold that article V, section 6 means what it says,
will all the Texas appellate courts be on the same wavelength. More
than mere uniformity will be the end result.
B.

The Proposal: Two Degrees of Appellate Evidentiary Review

In Combs, the court of criminal appeals demonstrated a continued
awareness that, in civil cases, there were two distinct levels of evidentiary complaint: factually insufficient evidence (insufficient evidence)
and legally insufficient evidence (no evidence). It further recognized
135. Citing the language and logic of Meraz, appellants in a number of appeals have
raised points challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict.
Such points have been denied on the basis that Meraz was strictly limited to issues on which a
defendant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd) (challenge of factual sufficiency of evidence to
support conviction denied; reliance on Meraz held "misplaced"); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d
356, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (Hunter's claim that verdict was
against great weight and preponderance of evidence rejected; Meraz did not generally change
standard of review for insufficient evidence in criminal cases); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854,
857 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (under Meraz challenge of factual insufficiency limited to issues on which defendant has burden of proof).
136. J. Thomas Sullivan, The Texas Court of CriminalAppeals: A Modest Critique of
Appellate Decisionmaking, 10 AM. J. CR1M. L. 113, 134 (1982) (discussing examples of court of
criminal appeals' failure to plainly interpret statutory provisions).
137. Paul Burka, Trial by Technicality, TEXAS MONTHLY, Apr. 1982, at 127, 241. Burka
states that, unless the court abandons its current philosophy, procedural reforms such as easing the court's workload will be pointless. Id.
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that, by virtue of the constitution, in civil cases, decisions of the
courts of appeals were final on factual insufficiency questions, while
the supreme court reviewed no evidence or legal insufficiency questions. Although acknowledging that article V, section 6 applied in
both civil and criminal cases, the court reiterated that it could not
pass on factual sufficiency questions. Without any apparent basis, the
court leaped the logic gap, saying that since it could not do so, neither
'
This notion, ill-conceived in Combs,
could the courts of appeals. 38
not only has never made sense, it is also plainly inconsistent with article V, section 6.
The proper resolution appears to be for the court of criminal appeals to acknowledge the constitutional authority granted to the
courts of appeals by virtue of article V, section 6 and to interpret that
provision as it is written-that is, to allow decisions of the courts of
appeals to be conclusive on all questions of fact. This would allow for
two degrees of appellate evidentiary complaint in both civil and criminal cases. This approach is legally and logically consistent with the
federal and state constitutions.' 3 9 Courts of appeals would then review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in all types of
138. This was accomplished through the infamous footnote one in Combs. Combs v.
State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 716 n. I (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Although language in Meraz expressly
disavows footnote one in Combs, apparently the court remains "unable to perceive" that courts
of appeals might review two degrees of evidentiary complaints: questions concerning factual as
well as legal sufficiency. Cf. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
(disavowing footnote one in Combs).
139. Max Osborn, Chief Justice of the El Paso Court of Appeals, recently suggested this
approach, which is consistent with a plain reading of article V, section 6. Osborn wrote for the
court that:
The existence of two degrees of appellate evidentiary complaint, with their differing concepts of error and their differing appellate procedures, is an elementary, fundamental
proposition in civil cases, yet historically alien to the criminal docket. There is, however,
no legal or logical basis for excluding such a dual approach in criminal cases. We referred
to our opinion in Schuessler, 647 S.W.2d at 748-749. In rejecting our analysis in that case,
and applying a modified standard of review under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), albeit indirectly by reference to Van Guilder v. State,
709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S. Ct. 2891, 90
L. Ed. 2d 978 (1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals attempted to maintain a "single
standard" of appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges, modifying its application only slightly when dealing with an affirmative defense or other issue upon which
the defense bears the burden of proof.
In any event, our suggestion that two degrees of appellate evidentiary complaint are
applicable in criminal cases is not inconsistent with any of the state or federal authority
relied upon in Schuessler, Van Guilder and Meraz.
Cooney v. State, 803 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, pet. ref'd).
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cases. When those courts determine the evidence to be factually insufficient, the appropriate remedy-in both civil and criminal casesis to reverse and remand for a new trial; when the evidence is determined to be legally insufficient, it is proper in all cases to reverse and
render. Furthermore, the court of criminal appeals would lack jurisdiction to review a court of appeals' determination on the question
concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence.
C.

ProposalProper under Federal ConstitutionalStandards
The proposal for two degrees of appellate complaint has been

demonstrated to be consistent with the Texas Constitution. Perhaps
one might question how the suggestion would mesh with the United
States Constitution. A cursory look at United States Supreme Court
decisions indicates that the suggestion is entirely consistent with federal constitutional principles. The Supreme Court has held that in
reviewing an appeal from a conviction for a criminal offense, when an
appellate court finds the evidence to be legally insufficient, the sovereign is constitutionally prohibited from further prosecution. 14 On
the other hand, when the evidence is factually insufficient, a defendant
may be retried; the appellate remedy is to reverse and remand for a
new trial.141 Thus, the procedure suggested here is entirely consistent
140. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 23 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16
(1978). In Burks, the defendant offered expert testimony to support his defense of insanity to
the charge of bank robbery. Burks, 437 U.S. at 2-3. Prior to the case being submitted to the
jury, the district court denied Burks' motion for acquittal. Id. at 3. He was found guilty. He
then filed a motion for new trial on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury's verdict. After his motion was denied, he appealed to the court of appeals, which agreed
that the evidence was insufficient and reversed his conviction. Id. In so doing, the court of
appeals conceded that Burks had raised a prima facie case of insanity and that the government
had not met its burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 4. However,
instead of dismissing the case against Burks, the court remanded to the district court in order
for it to determine if a directed verdict of acquittal or a new trial would be proper. Id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question of whether an accused may be retried
when his prior conviction was reversed by an appellate court solely because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. Id. at 2. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes retrial once the reviewing court finds the evidence
insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty. Id. at 18. Under these circumstances, the
only proper remedy available is for that court to direct a judgment of acquittal. Id.; see also
Greene, 437 U.S. at 26-27 (inasmuch as Burks held that Double Jeopardy Clause precluded
subsequent trial after reviewing court determines evidence insufficient to sustain guilty verdict,
case must be remanded for determination of whether lower court's basis for reversal was insufficient evidence).
141. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-43 (1982). Tibbs was convicted of rape and mur-
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with federal constitutional principles. 4 2
VI.

CONCLUSION

In continuing to refuse to give the state constitutional mandatethat decisions of courts of appeals "shall be conclusive on all quesder by a jury and subsequently sentenced to death. Id. at 35. On appeal, the state supreme
court reversed. A plurality of the Florida Supreme Court justices reviewed the evidence before
the jury and, based on what they determined were weaknesses and inconsistencies in the state's
case, they determined that a new trial was required "in the interests of justice." Id. (citing
Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976) (Tibbs I, initial reversal by Florida Supreme
Court)). The case was remanded to the trial court, which determined that a new trial would
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as the principles of Burks v. United States and
Greene v. Massey. Id. at 37. An intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case again for a new trial. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Id. In
doing so, the court detailed the difference between a reversal based on insufficient evidence and
one based on a determination by the appellate court that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Id. at 37-38. A determination by the appellate court that a lower court's holding is
founded on insufficient evidence means that, when the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, no rational finder of fact could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (insufficient
evidence evaluation in criminal cases centers on determination of whether or not the record
evidence would support a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt). However, when an appellate court concludes that a case must be reversed, based on the weight of the evidence, that
court is required to examine all of the evidence presented at trial. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d
1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 (1982). The "weight of the evidence" means that the
trier of fact determined that a greater amount of credible evidence supported one outcome over
another. Id. The Florida Supreme Court then concluded that the original Tibbs opinion was
reversed based on the weight of the evidence, since there was testimony in the record which
itself would constitute legally sufficient evidence to support Tibbs' conviction under Florida
law. Id. at 1126. Since it determined that Tibbs' previous convictions were not based on
insufficient evidence, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Burks and Massey did not
preclude Tibbs from being retried. Id. at 1127. Those decisions only prevent a defendant from
being retried when his conviction is based on insufficient evidence. The court went on to say
that the principles of double jeopardy are not implicated when a reversal is based on the weight
of the evidence. Id. In its review of the Florida Supreme Court's decision, the Supreme Court
examined a long line of its prior decisions and determined that that court's interpretation of
the principles of double jeopardy was correct. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 39-40; see, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969) (guarantee against double jeopardy does not impose
restrictions upon power to retry defendant whose first conviction was set aside); United States
v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) (government may retry defendant when prior conviction set
aside); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896) (defendant whose previous judgment
is set aside may be retried for same offense). In so determining, the Supreme Court stated its
belief that the granting of immunity from punishment to every accused whose first trial was
reversed due to defects would be too great a price for society to pay. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466.
Additionally, retrial after a conviction is reversed is not the kind of oppression that the Double
Jeopardy Clause sought to abolish. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 89-92 (1978).
142. This was quite obvious to the court of criminal appeals in the Meraz decision, as
Judge Duncan indicated. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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tions of fact"-its plain meaning, the court of criminal appeals demonstrates an inability to read plainly, a lack of common sense, and a
degree of inflexibility. It is perhaps because of such traits, among
other things, that in previous years the legislature, blue-ribbon panels,
and others have called for the abolition of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and have proposed a "unified" system in which the Texas
Supreme Court reviews civil and criminal appeals. 143 While a debate
of the merits of such a plan is well beyond the scope of this article,
two different readings of a single constitutional provision would not
occur under a unified system. Until the court of criminal appeals
demonstrates a more sensible approach to apparently plain questions,
it subjects itself to further attacks on its intellectual integrity and on
the need for its very existence.
The judicial article contemplates a system under which the courts
of appeals finally decide factual questions. The system is designed to
allow the highest courts in Texas to function properly to resolve conflicts in intermediate court decisions, and to supervise the orderly development of the law while determining significant legal issues. 1 4 If
143. In 1918, Roscoe Pound addressed the Texas Bar Association on "Judicial Organization," after which the bar adopted a report calling for a judicial article which would unify the
judicial structure in Texas under the supervision of the supreme court. Clarence A. Guittard,
Court Reform, Texas Style, 21 Sw. L.J. 451 (1967). Such Pound-style restructuring of the
judicial system has been favored by such bar leaders as C. S. Potts, James P. Alexander, Robert W. Stayton, Charles T. McCormick, Robert G. Storey, Charles I. Francis, and Robert W.
Calvert. Id. at 453. As early as 1953, a state bar constitutional revision panel proposed a
"unified" system. Should JudiciaryArticle Be Revised, 17 TEX. B.J. 686, 687 (1954). In 1972,
the Chief Justices' Task Force for Court Improvement recommended to the legislature a unified court system. C. Raymond Judice, The Texas Judicial System: Historical Development
and Efforts Towards Court Modernization, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 295, 329 (1973). Raymond Judice
proposed a unified court system with a supreme court exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Id. at 333. And, a constitutional amendment creating a unified system was submitted to the
voters in 1975. See John F. Onion, Jr., The Proposed Constitution: What's Wrong with Article
V, VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE Fall-Winter, 1975, at 2, 2-3. Others, for example Paul Burka,
have suggested that the court be abolished for less compelling reasons. See Paul Burka, Trial
by Technicality, TEXAS MONTHLY, Apr. 1982, at 127, 127.
144. Clarence A. Guittard, former Chief Justice of the Texas Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District, testified before the Judiciary Committee of the Texas Constitutional Convention
as to the proper role of a state's highest court in reviewing intermediate appellate court decisions and reduced his suggestions to writing in a letter to Representative Ben Z. Grant on
February 5, 1974. Clarence A. Guittard, Unifying the Texas Appellate Courts (1974) (unpublished essay on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). Concerning the role of the highest state
court in reviewing intermediate appellate court decisions, Guittard commented that, "Consequently, the conclusion may be drawn that the second review has only two proper functions, to
resolve conflicts in the decisions of the intermediate courts and to supervise the orderly development of the law, which would be uncertain at best if left to several courts of coordinate
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the court of criminal appeals were to follow the proposal suggested in
this article, it would not exercise any jurisdiction over factual questions. Then it could remain aloof from matters of factual dispute,
concern itself more with the truly significant questions of law, and at
the same time function in accordance with the spirit and letter of the
constitutional judicial article.

rank." Id. at 5. This comment is consistent with views expressed earlier that the highest state
court should concern itself with uniformity of the decisions of the intermediate appellate
courts and matters of public interest. See, e.g., A. H. McKnight, Suggestions for Improving
Court Procedure in Texas, 5 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1927) (appeals from intermediate courts
to highest court should be restricted); Joe Greenhill, State of the Judiciary, 42 TEX. B.J. 379,
380 (1979) (intermediate courts should handle great bulk of criminal cases).
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